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Plaintiff/Appellant and cross-Appellee Gary E. Reed ("Reed"), respectfully submits the
following reply brief.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-l - 78-31a-20 (1985) (the "Utah Arbitration Act")
§ 78-31a-3:

A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

§ 78-31a-4:

(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope
of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.

§ 78-31a-19: An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law for
appeals in civil actions from any court order:
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration;

ARGUMENT
In addition to responding to the three issues raised by Mr. Reed in his appeal, the District
has cross-appealed as to one additional issue: whether the grievance procedure constitutes an
arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration Act. In the interest of efficiency, Mr. Reed
responds to this newly raised issue, together with the issues raised by Mr. Reed, in this Reply
Brief.

(r\app-rep tew cjt)
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I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DISTRICT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS.
As established in Mr. Reed's opening brief, a Motion to Dismiss was not a proper

response to a Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the trial court erred in granting the District's
motion. A motion to compel arbitration does not constitute an action — like a Complaint which requires the pleading of a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rather, a Motion to
Compel Arbitration seeks only an order that the parties shall arbitrate.

Furthermore, as

discussed at length in the opening brief, the District did not meet the burden of such a Motion
in any event. Indeed, a Motion to Compel Arbitration, pursuant to statute, need set forth only
one fact - the existence of an arbitration agreement, to properly overcome a motion to dismiss.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1993). Mr. Reed's verified Motion plainly set forth the
existence of an arbitration agreement.1 Thus, the trial court erred in looking beyond the facts
as pled in Mr. Reed's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

IL

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PROFESSIONAL
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
In bringing a cross-appeal, the District raises one new issue not raised in Mr. Reed's

original appeal: whether the Professional Agreement that governs the parties' employment
contains an arbitration provision that is subject to the Utah Arbitration Act. The District
contends that the Professional Agreement is not subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration
Act because it provides only a grievance procedure and not a mechanism for binding arbitration.

1

In addition, the trial court correctly concluded that an arbitration agreement in fact
existed.
(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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In support of its position, the District makes essentially two arguments. First, the District
maintains that there is no right to arbitrate pursuant to the Professional Agreement because it
nowhere contains the word "arbitrate." Second, relying on an Oregon case, the District argues
that no arbitration agreement exists within the Professional Agreement because the grievance
procedure contained in that agreement is not final and binding. Neither argument is persuasive.
A.

An Arbitration Agreement Need not Contain the Word "Arbitrate."

While the grievance procedure contained within the professional agreement nowhere
contains the word "arbitrate," it clearly evinces an intent by both parties to submit disputes
thereunder to arbitration. The grievance procedure sets forth several steps that an employee
should take to invoke arbitration. Section 5.4.1 of the Professional Agreement provides that,
first, a complainant is to attempt informal discussions with his principal or immediate supervisor.
If such discussions do not resolve any grievance, then four formal steps may be taken pursuant
to section 5.4.2.
Step one allows an employee to invoke the formal procedure by sending a written form
to "the principal or immediate supervisor." Prof. Agreement at 50. "If the educator is not
satisfied with the disposition of the grievance at Step 1," he may forward his complaint to the
Superintendent of Schools pursuant to Step 2. See Prof. Agreement at 51. Step 3 provides as
follows:
Step 3: If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in Step 2, the educator
... may submit the grievance to a hearing examiner ....
Prof. Agreement at 51. Step 3 goes on to describe the process for selecting a hearing examiner.
Finally, Step 4 provides as follows:
(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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Step 4: If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in Step 3, the educator
and/or his/her chosen representative may request and be granted a hearing before the
Board of Education in executive session. Following an executive session, the Board will
render its decision in an open meeting....
Prof. Agreement at 51.
It is difficult to imagine how a contract could more clearly set forth an arbitration
procedure. Whether the procedure is labeled a grievance or arbitration, it is subject to a final
determination by a body acting as an arbitrator of the dispute. The District's semantical
distinction simply is unpersuasive. To accept the District's argument in this regard would be
similar to finding that no binding contract exists because the parties to the contract chose to use
the word "agreement" rather than "contract." It is settled that courts look not to the form or
labels by which parties choose to title their agreements, but to the substance of the agreement.
In this case, the substance clearly calls for an arbitration process.
B.

The Procedure Contained in the Professional Agreement is Final and Binding.

The District also argues that the grievance procedure contained in the Professional
Agreement is not final and binding and, therefore, cannot constitute an arbitration agreement.
The District points to the last sentence of Step 4, which provides as follows:
Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the right of the District or the educator to
appeal to an appropriate court of law.
Prof. Agreement at 51. The District also cites an Oregon case holding that a contract between
a school district and its employees contained no arbitration agreement because the procedure was
not final and binding. See Van Eck v. Oregon State Employees Ass'n. 574 P.2d 633 (Or.
1978).

Not only is Van Eck not controlling, it is inapposite to this situation and is not

(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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persuasive. In Van Eck, the procedure was in fact binding only on the association and the
employees were free to seek any available remedy after having followed all available
administrative steps. That is simply not the case here.
Step 4 of the grievance procedure clearly indicates that the procedure is binding on both
parties. The District has pointed to the right to appeal to an appropriate court of law, as set
forth in Step 4, as somehow negating the binding nature of the arbitration process. The fact that
the procedure allows an appeal does not make the procedure any less binding than the final order
of any trial court would be simply because it may be appealed.
m.

PUBLIC POLICY MANDATES THAT ANY DOUBTS REGARDING
ARBITRABILITY BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION.
The District maintains that Mr. Reed waived his right to arbitration. No such waiver has

occurred. To the contrary, Reed has acted in a manner consistent with his clear intent aot to
waive his right to arbitration.
It is well settled in Utah, as in other jurisdictions, that public policy strongly favors
arbitration. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah. 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992).
Public policy not only approves but encourages arbitration as a method of settling disputes
because it generally is less expensive and eases court congestion. Id. Accordingly, any doubt
concerning arbitrability ought to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Given the strong public
policy favoring arbitration, the right to arbitrate is not to be waived unless the intent to waive
is clear. Red Skv Homeowners Ass'n v. Heritage Cove. 701 P.2d 603, 604 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984).

(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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Under Utah law, it is also well settled that waiver does not occur absent voluntary
relinquishment of a known right. E.g.. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857
P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) (rejecting previous, more specific, statements of the rule of waiver in
favor of this general statement - which is to be applied to each case on its facts). In other
words, the waiving party must (1) clearly know of the rights which will be waived by this
action; and (2) voluntarily and intentionally relinquish such rights.

Furthermore, such

relinquishment must be clearly intended under the facts of the case. Id. at 941; see also Hunter
v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) ("[T]o constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct
must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must
be inconsistent with any other intent.").2
2

As noted in Mr. Reed's opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified (and likely
overruled) the standard as set forth in Hunter. The Court, however, went on to state that "the
Hunter language was not inappropriate under the facts of that case ... [but] went well beyond
the elements of proof [relevant to waiver]." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940. The Soter's Court went
on to hold "that a fact finder . . . assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
the relinquishment is clearly intended." Id. at 941.
Soter's further provides that prior statements of the rule that rely on application of rules
of waiver in specific types of cases or under specific facts should no longer be followed.
Rather, the general principle — that to constitute waiver, one must voluntarily relinquish a
known right — is to be applied to specific facts. The court went on to explain:
This general statement of the proof that is necessary to show
intentional relinquishment is all the specification that we think appropriate.
Beyond this, the appellate courts of this state need not attempt to articulate
as general principles the specific facts that are required to show intentional
relinquishment in particular cases. Over time, factual patterns may emerge
from affirmances and reversals of specific decisions that may serve to flesh
out the law, but that does not require repeated reformulation of the general
statement.... In fact, such attempts at reformulation can be detrimental,
as the history of appellate case law since Hunter demonstrates.
(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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The "evidence" upon which the District relies in arguing waiver does not establish that
Mr. Reed voluntarily relinquished his right to arbitration. Application of strong public policy
considerations to the facts of this case weigh heavily in favor of this Court ordering the District
to submit to arbitration as clearly provided under the Agreement between Mr. Reed and the
District.
IV.

MR. REED HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION IN ANY
EVENT.
The District has failed meet its "burden of establishing [both] substantial participation and

prejudice" as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. Chandler. 833 P.2d at 358.
Reed's actions prior to filing his Motion to Compel Arbitration do not rise to a level constituting
"substantial participation" in litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. In
addition, even assuming his actions constituted substantial participation in litigation, which they
did not, the District has not been prejudiced.

Id. at 941. In discussing the evolution away from this general standard, the Court stated:
[W]e think that the error resulted from the rather random movement in our
law of waiver away from pure legal requirements toward a description of
facts that seemed important in particular situations in determining whether the
legal requirements of waiver were met. Unfortunately, we and the court of
appeals tended to elevate to statements of general application what amounted to
case-bound determinations of factual sufficiency.
Id. at 941. In other words, the general statement of the principle of waiver does not change
depending on the context (e.g., arbitration). Rather the principle remains constant. Waiver has
occurred only if, under the facts of the case, an intentional relinquishment of a known right has
occurred.
(r\app-rcp.tew cjt)
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A.

Mr. Reed has not Substantially Participated in Litigation.

In Chandler, the Court found that Blue Cross (the party seeking arbitration) had, prior
to filing a motion seeking to compel arbitration, filed an answer and a cross complaint and had
participated in five months of extensive formal discovery. The Court held that by participating
in such extensive discovery — discovery which would not have been available in arbitration -Blue Cross clearly had manifested its intent to proceed to trial. Thus, the Chandler court held
that Blue Cross' action satisfied the first prong of the test.
Mr. Reed, on the other hand, has engaged in no discovery. Indeed, although he filed
a formal Complaint against the District, he dismissed the Complaint before the District filed an
answer. Reed's actions were at the beginning point on the litigation continuum. Certainly they
did not rise to either "substantial participation" or to the inconsistency point. Reed's actions in
dismissing his Complaint under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41 manifest not an intent to waive
arbitration, but rather just the opposite. Furthermore, it is important to note that at the time
Reed filed the Complaint, the District already had refused to act on his attempt at arbitration.
[Record at 127-132; see Fact 4 in Opening Brief and Exhibit B.] Indeed, prior to taking any
other action. Mr. Reed attempted to invoke the arbitration procedures set forth in the
Professional Agreement by letter dated September 19, 1992. fSee Opening Brief, Exhibit B.]
It was only when the District failed to respond in any way to Mr. Reed's attempt at arbitration
that he pursued additional avenues. In short, the first prong of the Chandler test has not been
satisfied in this case.

(r\app-rcp.tew.cjt)
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The District's likening of Mr. Reed's GRAMA request to formal discovery is equally
unavailing. Unlike formal discovery, any information available to Mr. Reed under GRAMA
would equally be available to him under an arbitration process. Indeed, under Utah law, any
member of the public can, at any time, request access to public records pursuant to GRAMA.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (1992). A GRAMA request simply does not equate to formal
discovery.
B.

The District has not been Prejudiced.

The second prong that must be established in order to find waiver of arbitration under
Chandler is a finding of prejudice to the party opposing arbitration. As set forth in the opening
brief, no prejudice exists in this case. Indeed, the District is unable to establish prejudice under
any of the three examples cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. First, Mr. Reed has
gained no advantage through participation in pre-trial procedures. Unlike the party in Board of
Education, Taos Municipal School v. The Architects. Taos. 709 P.2d 184, 186 (N.M. 1985),
Mr. Reed has not availed himself of any discovery process "which would have been lost under
arbitration." iaos« 709 P.2d at 186. No discovery has occurred between Reed and the District,
and certainly none that would have been lost under arbitration.
Similarly, the District is unable to establish prejudice under the Utah Supreme Court.s
second example; i.e., that "the party seeking arbitration is attempting to forum shop after 'the
judicial waters [have]. . . been tested.'" Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359. As stated in Wood v.
Miller's National Insurance Co.. 632P.2d 1163, 1165-66 (N.M. 1981), relied upon by the Utah
Supreme Court in support of its second example of prejudice:

(r\app-rep tew cjt)
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The instigation of legal action is not determinative for purposes of deciding
whether a party has waived arbitration. The point of no return is reached when
the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes the court's discretionary power,
prior to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for
arbitration.
Wood, 632 P.2d at 1165-66 (emphasis added); see also Bernalillo City Medical Center
Employees v. Cancelosi, 587 P.2d 960, 963 (N.M. 1978) (the case was not at issue and since
no hearings have been held, the judicial waters had not been tested prior to the time the motion
for arbitration had been filed). Mr. Reed has not invoked or sought to invoke the discretionary
powers of any court prior to the filing of the Motion to Compel Arbitration. The judicial waters
simply have not been tested.
Finally, Mr. Reed has not caused the District "to undergo the types of expenses that
arbitration is designed to alleviate." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359.

In support of this third

example, the Chandler court cited several cases in which the opposing party had incurred
significant expenses during a formal discovery process. Id. at 359 n.16; see also, e.g.. Price
v. Drexell Burnham Lambert. Inc.. 791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant
initiated extensive discovery without demanding arbitration). Taos. 709 P.2d at 185 (same). The
court did not cite, nor did it rely upon, any case wherein the opposing party had not been
subjected to substantial formal discovery expense. The District has presented only inadmissible
evidence of having incurred expense and, even then, has wholly failed to establish that it
otherwise would have avoided such purported expense under arbitration.

(r\app-rep.tcw.cjt)
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In short, Reed has gained no advantage, procedurally or otherwise, by filing and then
voluntarily dismissing a lawsuit prior to his Motion to Compel Arbitration. In addition, unlike
the example cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. Reed has not engaged in forum
shopping. No court ever has exercised its discretionary power with regard to this case. The
District has suffered no prejudice as defined by the Utah Supreme Court.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO STRIKE, AND IN
RELYING UPON INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN. THE
AFFIDAVITS OF FELSHAW KING AND MEL MILES,
The District claims that even if the court should have stricken portions of the affidavits

of Felshaw King and Mel Miles, its failure to do so was harmless. In essence, the District
argues that Reed suffered no harm from the court's reliance on such affidavits in that (1) Reed
admitted some of the same facts in his opening brief, (2) "statements contained in the Affidavits
did nothing more than supplement the arguments made by the School District, or (3) the
statements in the Affidavits were made on the basis of personal knowledge." Appellee Brief at
23.
These arguments are unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that the affidavits were
offered and considered in support of the District's so-called motion to dismiss ~ requiring all
facts to be frozen as stated in the pleadings on record. In addition, there are several obvious
problems with the District's logic. First, Mr. Reed has not admitted any facts that correspond
to objections to statements in the affidavits.

In addition, perhaps the most important and

prejudicial "fact" supported only in the affidavits is the claim that the District has expended
substantial amounts of money in responding to Mr. Reed's claimed discrimination.

(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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No

discovery has been conducted on this issue and it is impossible for Mr. Reed to dispute or admit
any such statements. Affidavits offered in support of a motion to dismiss that are immune from
attack do not become admissible by a statement that they are "made on personal knowledge" or
that they merely "supplemented the arguments" espoused by movant. Indeed, while it may be
permissible to introduce evidence in support of a motion to dismiss (thus automatically
converting it into a motion for summary judgment), such evidence will not carry the day where
it is still contrary to facts as plead unless beyond any genuine dispute. The District's facts
clearly are not beyond any genuine dispute. Finally, "evidence" set forth in the form of affidavit
testimony is irrelevant because there is no evidence from, or even allegation by, the District that
it would have avoided any expense it allegedly has incurred were it to be required to submit to
arbitration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's decision that the Professional Agreement contains an arbitration agreement subject to the
Utah Arbitration Act. Mr. Reed further requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
determination of waiver and remand this case and instruct the trial court to enter an order
compelling the District to submit to arbitration with Mr. Reed.
//
//
//

(r\app-rep.tew.cjt)
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DATED this ( V ^ day of July, 1994.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

t%L

F. James, Esq.
Terry E. Welch, Esq.
Attorneys for Gary Reed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (7 -^day of July, 1994, a true and correct copy of the
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